Police, Internet Providers Try to Deter Online Suicide Pacts

December 15, 2005 By 1 Comment

If you enter the Japanese word for “suicide” into Yahoo Japan’s search engine one of the first sites to come up is the “suicide bulletin board.” The front page explains the site’s aims: “This is a bulletin board to discuss suicide,” it reads. “From postings by the suicidal, to discussions about the rights and wrongs of suicide, to suicide prevention, anything is O.K. . . . read the site on your cell phone too.”

Among the ongoing discussion threads is one headed “Why can’t I die?” “When I think about it, I could die at any time, but why don’t I die? I can go so far, but why can’t I take the last step?” Another is titled: “Please teach me about suicide.” The poster writes that he or she is a university student studying suicide. Elsewhere on the list of threads: “Everyone in my class hates me,” writes a young poster. “They talk about me behind my back and ignore me . . . after all, perhaps I should kill myself like they say I should.” One reply further down the thread reads: “It’s the fault of the bullying, not yours. Don’t think about suicide.”

The suicide rate in Japan has long been one of the highest in the world. In 2004, 32,325 people committed suicide — about 20 times the number of people murdered. And in the last few years, there has been a frightening increase in the number of group suicides arranged over the Internet through chat rooms dedicated to discussing suicide.

This April, Kyodo newswire reported a grimly typical case of suspected Internet suicide in which two men and a woman who were found dead in a car in Chichibu, a town in the Tokyo commuter belt. The windows of the car had been sealed from the inside with adhesive tape and three charcoal stoves were found in the car — the victims had died from carbon monoxide poisoning. There have been a series of similar cases. Japan’s National Police Agency reported 75 deaths in suspected Internet-arranged suicides from January to August this year compared with 55 deaths during the whole of 2004.

Dr. Tadashi Takeshima of the National Institute of Mental Health, who helped compile an institute report on Internet-arranged suicide, believes that the Web sites are dangerous because they enable suicide pacts between individuals who might never commit suicide on their own. Once caught up in a group pact, they find they cannot turn back. He says that often the members of the suicide pacts are in their teens or 20s and strangers except for contact through the sites. In other group suicides the victims are normally lovers, friends or at least known to each other, but in these cases police only find a connection when they check the victims’ computers or mobile phones.

Dr. Takeshima’s study group looked at a number of sites to decide whether action against them was needed, but despite their concerns, they stopped short of recommending that sites be shut down. “It’s very difficult to conclude that any one site is harmful,” he said.

Apart from the cathartic benefit for some users in discussing their depression, there are also people who log onto the sites to try and help those considering suicide. Yukiko Nishihara, founder of the Tokyo Branch of Befrienders Worldwide, a suicide prevention organization, says that some of their 60 volunteers monitor the chat rooms, chat with users and post the numbers of the NGO’s suicide helplines.

In mid-2004, Internet providers, police, academics and NGOs began meeting to discuss what action to take about suicide chat rooms and how to prevent suicide pacts. Four groups covering 80 to 90 percent of providers issued guidelines in October 2005 specifying how police and Internet companies will cooperate.

Hiroyuki Kuwako of the Japan Telecom Services Association, one of the groups, says that before the guidelines were set, it was difficult for providers to pass on personal information about suicide chat room users. If a crime is being committed, providers are obliged to hand over information. But even faced with an imminent suicide attempt they feared breaking the law if they passed on names and addresses. “Because suicide isn’t a crime, it’s down to the providers’ judgment whether or not to give out the personal information,” says Kuwako. Even in urgent cases sometimes the providers had to consult with lawyers before notifying the police.

The new guidelines mean that providers can pass on information without fear of violating rules on freedom of expression and privacy, says Yoshikuni Masuyama, deputy director of the National Police Agency Cyber-Crime Division. “I think the guidelines are most useful for the providers,” he says. “Before, because the providers didn’t give out the information, it was said that people were dying needlessly.”

The guidelines use an existing law that lets police request personal information if someone’s life is in danger (for example finding out the address of someone involved in a car accident through their mobile phone company). According to new rules, if the police believe that a Web site user’s life is in danger they will submit a form to the person’s provider. The Internet provider will look at the form and decide whether or not to cooperate with the request.

Kuwako stressed, however, that “providers don’t check the messages. If we did that, it would be a kind of censorship.” Tipping off the police is instead left to chat room users. If anyone believes that a poster is seriously intending to kill themselves they can notify the police who may contact the provider. The system could also used in other situations, say if someone receives an e-mail from an Internet friend, which leads them to believe that person may be about to kill themselves. According to Kuwako, the guidelines were put into action at least twice in the first month.

As well as the guidelines, a suicide-prevention Web site has also been set up by the National Institute of Mental Health. The Web site is called “ikiru” (to live).

Dr. Takeshima says that they began by looking at material on suicide on the Internet. “As we thought, there was a lot of harmful information,” he says. Some sites give detailed instructions about how to commit suicide. “We thought we should use the Internet to try and prevent suicide too,” he said. The NIMH site publishes suicide research, coordinates suicide prevention efforts and gets around 250 hits per day. Although the site monitors do not correspond directly with depressed individuals, some enquiries are directed to telephone help lines and mental health centers.

Another outcome of the study was that media organizations were asked not to publish detailed information about actual sites and methods of suicide – although their advice generally has not been followed so far, said Takeshima. He does not want to give his opinion on whether the media have made the problem worse by publicizing it, though he notes that few cases have been reported in the media recently. “Has the number of Internet suicide cases reduced, or are they continuing but have lost their freshness for the media?” he asked.

In fact, according to the National Police Agency, the number of cases of Internet-arranged suicide has decreased since the guidelines were introduced in October. Takeshima speculates that that may be because Web site users know that their personal information may be passed to the police if they attempt to carry out a suicide pact.

But despite the intense media attention that Internet-arranged suicides have received, the number of such cases is still tiny compared to the number of overall suicides in Japan. In 2004, 6.1 percent fewer people committed suicide than in the previous year but that was still an increase of 50 percent since 1994.The sharpest jump occurred at the end of the 1990s, near the peak of Japan’s recent economic down-turn. Seventy-two percent of people who commit suicide in Japan are men, most of who are in their 50s or 60s – the group hit hardest by the recession.

“The government needs to recognize that suicide is not a personal problem, it is a social problem,” said Yukiko Nishihara of suicide helpline Befrienders Worldwide. “They are good at setting up academic studies of suicide, but [the government] need[s] to cooperate with NGOs.”

And while every effort should be made to prevent Internet-arranged suicide pacts, people should remember that the technology is just a tool, Takeshima said. “In Tokyo, there are a lot of tall buildings, so that is a means of suicide [there]. In the countryside, people use agricultural chemicals . . . The simple reason [why young people arrange group suicide through the Internet] is that young people use the Internet.”

Filed Under: Internet

Human Rights NGOs and the Media: Allies or Adversaries?

December 1, 2005 By Leave a Comment

Are the media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Japan friends or foes? How should the media cover NGOs? Should NGOs stage media stunts? Those were some of the questions posed to a panel of activists and journalists in Kyoto last month. Though the Japanese civil society sector has traditionally been smaller than in other major developed countries, the growing role of NGOs is one of most fundamental changes occurring in Japan today.

Since 1998, when a law was passed making it easier for organizations to register as NPOs (non-profit organizations), 23,608 groups have gained NPO status. As NPOs take up their new role in Japanese society, how NPOs use traditional and new media, and how the media portray NPOs and their work, will be crucial to the development of Japan’s still relatively young civil society sector.

The Nov. 12 seminar, titled “Human Rights NGOs and the Media: Allies or Adversaries?”, was held at Kyoto Sangyo University as part of the 2005 Peace as a Global Language Conference. Moderated by Eric Johnston of the Japan Times, the seminar featured Masami Ito, a Japan Times reporter, Yuji Yoshitomi, an Osaka-based writer from weekly tabloid Friday magazine, and activist, writer and American-born naturalized Japanese citizen Debito Arudou.

The first speaker, Masami Ito, explained how her work covering immigration issues brings her into contact with many NPOs. She stressed the importance of objectivity. “News reporters are not activists. News reports must just communicate facts and it’s our job to let the readers form their own opinions.” Ito also gave advice to activists hoping to communicate through the media, suggesting that they “network with media people and become a source of information.”

Yuji Yoshitomi, Friday magazine journalist and author of “Osaka Bankrupts”, an expose of corruption in the Osaka city administration, spoke next. In his speech Yoshitomi confided that he has never deliberately set out to write about everyday NPO work, but he has had to report on NPOs involved in acts of criminal deception. He said he has been told by police sources that some organized crime Yazuka groups have set up NPOs as a front for their activities.

Debito Arudou was on hand to give an activist’s perspective. He had plenty of practical advice for activists dealing with the media. “Activism in Japan can be a tough job, but not impossible,” he said. “I do not consider [the media] ‘adversarial.’ It’s a matter of having the right message and knowing your audience.”

Arudou stressed that anyone with a message to spread can hold a press conference. “Contact the press club connected with the agency or outlet you are trying to canvass, and tell them the time and place. Simple as that.” Although organizing the kind of coverage you need may be a different matter, he said, “Remember any article your issue gets is a minor miracle—a major one if they get the information right.”

He also had advice for those dealing directly with journalists: “Even more miraculous is a one-on-one with a reporter. But remember that due to editors and editorial constraints, things rarely, if ever, come out in an article as you wanted.” Arudou recommended that activists provide primary sources because “reporters love photocopies.”

Lastly, Arudou listed some barriers to activism that he has bumped up against in Japan. They include: a culture of information control (“just about every organization, and especially the bureaucracy, is closed to outsiders”); the press club system (“one-stop shopping, but also self-censorship and information control”); and the threat of violence from extremist groups.

In the question-and-answer session, moderator Eric Johnston introduced the question of credibility: how do journalists tell if NPOs are bona fide or not? Japan Times reporter Ito said she began by checking NPO’s past activities and how they have spent their funds. She also talks to her own legal and NPO contacts. Friday magazine journalist Yoshitomi noted that some NPOs have no choice but to get involved in business because they have considerable trouble raising funds. Activist Arudou countered that some NPOs are bad, but so are some companies and government institutions; NPOs should be prepared to be judged on their deeds.

Another questioner asked the panelists if they thought the media’s attitude to the NPO sector had changed significantly in recent years. While Ito and Arudou were unsure that it had, Yoshitomi argued that “the work done by NPOs and NGOs is now more appreciated by the mass media. NPOs involved in low-profile activities have come up with visible outcomes.” He drew on an example from his research on the Osaka administration. “An NPO was the first to disclose evidence of corruption by the Osaka authorities,” he said. “The mass media have strongly praised their work.”

One more question from the audience drew the seminar to a close: “Are media stunts necessary or useful for activists in Japan?” Arudou was emphatic that they are. “You have to draw attention to an activity. It’s not news if it’s not new,” he said. “Sometimes stunts are very useful.” He referred to one well reported stunt he undertook last year with a group of fellow activists. Dressed as seals they held a picnic on the banks of the Tamagawa river in Yokohama in protest against the issuance of a residency certificate to “Tama-chan,” a seal living in the city’s Tama river—something denied to non-Japanese human taxpayers.

While Yoshitomi was unconvinced that such stunts are really necessary, Ito described one “unintentional stunt” she witnessed during a press conference with a group of Kurdish asylum seekers. When news of one member’s deportation came mid-press conference, the family started weeping in front of the cameras. Even Japan’s right-of-center Yomiuri daily newspaper carried the story. “I don’t know if stunts are good or bad,” Ito said, “but when something conspicuous happens, it gets media attention.”

By chance, NPOs were in the news only a few days before the event with controversy surrounding the Japanese branch of the global “Whiteband” anti-poverty campaign. Earlier this fall the media reported that none of the money from sales of 4 million 300-yen wristbands was actually going directly to developing world charities. Initially, the group stressed that the campaign’s aim was simply to raise consciousness of the poverty issue. Following further hostile publicity and hundreds of angry e-mails from purchasers of the bands, in early November the group of NPOs backtracked and pledged to give $250,000 (30 million yen) to Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, and $50,000 (6 million yen) to various related civil society activities.

While some might see this and other coverage of apparent NPO scandals as evidence of the media hostility towards NPOs, Temple University professor Jeff Kingston stresses that the media in Japan have in general been “cheerleaders for the NPO movement.” He says that the media’s support dates back to the 1995 Kobe earthquake when the media contrasted the incompetence of the official response with the effectiveness of volunteer groups. The earthquake was a powerful impetus to the development of the NPO movement.

Kingston noted how publications of differing political perspective support NPOs for their own different reasons. The left-of-center Asahi newspaper supports NPOs as watchdogs and a check on establishment power, but the financial daily Nikkei supports NPOs because they advocate small government. He says if the media focuses on scandals, it is because most of the day-to-day work of NPOs is less obvious – and perhaps less likely to sell newspapers. “The media is not well suited to focus on the gradual and incremental changes and mundane work that are ongoing now because they won’t be bearing fruit for 10, 15, 20 years down the road. Ultimately, the media has a short attention span and much of the work of NPOs is not headline-grabbing.”

As for NPOs themselves, how they make use of the media – particularly the Internet and new media—is likely to have a big influence on the success of their activities. “Create a Web site,” said activist Arudou. “You need an information center, and a Web site will act as your 24-hour setter of the record straight. Saves time, energy, and money. It will also give reporters a place to shop for information beforehand. Many reporters write their articles before they even meet you, and are just looking for live quotes.” Arudou also recommends that activists build an e-mail list of supporters and journalists. “Takes years before it becomes effective, but I have thousands of recipients (and hopefully readers), some of whom forward around what I write, even to fellow reporters.”

So what does the future hold in store for Japan’s NPOs and what role will the media play? In his book Japan’s Quiet Transformation: Social Change and Civil Society in the 21st Century Jeff Kingston argues that the growth of NPOs, as well as new information disclosure legislation and judicial reform, are fundamental changes that are incrementally and fitfully bringing about a quiet transformation of Japanese society. He says that the economically stagnant 1990s, rather than being a “lost decade,” were “a time of dynamic transformation and reform.”

Kingston argues that the government may do its best to keep NPOs “on a short leash,” but are unlikely to be successful in the long run. “I think what the government wants is to control them and decide,” he says. “Ultimately, I think society is going to play a role in deciding what role [NPOs] play, and the media will play a big role in shaping people’s awareness of them.”

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Master of the Message

October 5, 2005 By 2 Comments

An Asahi Newspaper editorial called the recent Japanese general election campaign “one of the most interesting elections ever.” Certainly, few polls in memory have so gripped the public and media.

When Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi took a deeply divided Liberal Democratic Party into the snap election, many believed it was political suicide. Koizumi staked his political life and his legacy on the poll. In any event, “lionheart” Koizumi’s brinkmanship paid off. The Sept. 11 poll delivered the ruling party a historic landslide victory. As Gerald Curtis, an expert in Japanese politics at Columbia University, commented shortly after the election: “This was not a victory of the LDP, this was a victory of Koizumi.”

Ofer Feldman, a professor at Doshisha University, credits much of Koizumi’s success to his astute (and sometimes forceful) handling of the media. He says that Koizumi is a new kind of politician for a new kind of Japanese political culture – more a leader in the Western style than the old consensus-building traditional Japanese politician. He is a leader who “has a dialogue with the people and the ability to influence them.”

Some commentators have spoken of a watershed in Japanese politics, yet Feldman is skeptical. He doesn’t think the LDP’s grassroots political machine has changed much; “pork-barrel politics will probably continue forever.” And he points out that the prime minster’s phenomenal success may be a double-edged sword for the party. Koizumi has shown himself to be a master of political theater. When the time comes to choose a new leader, he will be a tough act to follow.

Israeli-born Ofer Feldman is a Professor of Political Process in the Faculty of Policy Studies at Doshisha University. He is the author of “Talking Politics in Japan Today,” “The Japanese Political Personality” and “Politics and the News Media in Japan.”

JMR: Koizumi very successfully focused the election on one issue – postal-reform. Why couldn’t the Democratic Party broaden the debate?

Ofer Feldman: If there was effective journalism [in Japan], they would have forced the ruling party to put more issues on the agenda. The media here play according to rules dictated by politicians.

Koizumi was very clever. The electorate, generally speaking, thinks in a very simple way. If you give them two issues, it is too complicated for them. That was the mistake of the Democratic Party. Koizumi said that there is only one issue – postal reform. You give the people a simple sentence, one issue and you will win the election.

JMR: Could last month’s election be described as Japan’s first presidential style contest?

OF: It could. It was Koizumi against Okada. If you look at the posters and television commercials, you had not five different parties, but five different leaders.

JMR: What did Okada and the Democratic Party of Japan do wrong to lose so catastrophically?

OF: Okada was criticized even within his own party. He didn’t know how to use the media, or how to project his opinions as the opposition leader. He couldn’t compete with Koizumi. He gave the appearance of being [a] serious politician without a sense of humor.

He was not as charismatic as Koizumi and didn’t give the impression that he was the right person to lead Japan now. Maybe 10 or 15 years ago he could have succeeded on a local level, but he isn’t a national leader.

JMR: Is Koizumi a new kind of Japanese leader?

OF: Koizumi is the product of the “presidentialization” of the prime-ministership. In the 1990s there were structural changes within Japanese politics, and changes in political culture. The people’s attitude towards leadership changed. They became ready to accept goal-orientated leaders rather than old-fashioned consensus-building leaders.

They were looking for somebody who will stand in front of the press and say, “I will do it. I don’t care what everybody thinks.” This was exactly the situation that paved the way for Koizumi.

JMR: How much of Koizumi’s success was down to the way he used the media?

OF: Everyone is talking about how Koizumi manipulated the media using sound bites. He creates catch-phrase politics, one-phrase politics. He decides the content and length of the phrases himself. He decides when he is going to meet the media. He asks them for the questions they will ask in advance, he talks for 4-5 minutes and then he leaves.

If there was real media here, they would say, “You are not going to decide what you are going to tell us, and we are not going to give you the questions in advance.” I’ve spoken with political reporters, and they hate it. But this is how they make their living so they don’t want to criticize it. If you talk to the editors, they say that this is not the way that a leader is supposed to behave in democracy; in a democracy you are supposed to answer questions that reporters give you.

JMR: How unusual was the tactic of bringing in “assassins” from outside to stand against the postal rebels?

OF: It is not completely new. In the Upper House they are traditionally called “talento giin” (TV personality Diet members). But in this case they are not just celebrities. If you look at those who were mobilized by the LDP to run against the rebels, they are professionals; talented people not “tarento.”

It’s an excellent thing. Traditionally, politicians had to have a degree in law, now they are coming from various areas of life. Now you can have a debate in the Diet. Koizumi picked them the same way that he selected his ministers in the first administration – one by one, not by considering the strengths of the LDP factions. He decided who he wanted to work with. He broke the rules.

JMR: Why did the most famous assassin, Internet entrepreneur Horie Takafumi, lose?

OF: His opponent Shizuka Kamei was known in the electoral district. He started as a local politician and he has worked there for the last 30 years. He has his organization of supporters. He contributes to the community. They talk about three things in Japan: “Jiban” (political base) “Kanban” (signpost) and “Kaban” (bag). Kaban is money.

Kamei also has personality; he knows how to perform in front of political supporters and the TV cameras. One TV program followed Kamei for several days. He appeared lecturing in a remote community in Hiroshima, his electoral district. When one person in the audience complained about the way the Construction Ministry handled a certain problem near their home, Kamei immediately instructed his secretary to call a high-ranking official in the ministry. Kamei spoke to the Ministry in front of the cameras and asked them to solve the problem as soon as possible.

Horie can’t do that. You have to have contacts and, of course, the ability to perform. Horie has the money so he can play politics. He’s a bad example of someone who uses their money to entertain themselves by running in an election.

JMR: Has Japanese politics really changed at the local level?

OF: My students and I conducted research during the recent election campaign in various ways. When we went to candidates’ speeches, we heard the same old style of politics. We heard candidates promise: “I will do something for the community. Please trust me. I will help you to build bridges here, establish schools here.” Candidates, especially LDP candidates, spoke about how they can contribute to the community – and then also mentioned Koizumi’s reform, political style and vision.

One female LDP candidate we got on video lectured for about 10 to 20 minutes, mostly about the resemblance between her name “Kyoko” and the city “Kyoto.” At the end she insisted that she was going to shake hands with everyone who came to the meeting.

Pork-barrel politics will probably continue forever. This is the old style of electioneering. You vote for the candidate whose face you saw, whose hand you touched. She talked a little in general about politics, but there was one key word in her speech, and in that of all the other LDP candidates – “Koizumi.” All the candidates used his reputation and plans to get elected.

JMR: Koizumi is due to finish his tenure as prime minister next September. Will the media participate in the debate to choose his successor?

OF: The media are very timid; they never choose the prime minister in Japan. They can criticize the prime minister, but they can’t choose him. They see their role more as influencing public opinion after the decision.

Also, since the 1990s, due to various factors, including the change in the election law and Koizumi’s own actions, LDP factions haven’t played their traditional role in the selection of future leaders. They have lost power and just become “study groups” to discuss policy.

At the moment, there isn’t even one likely candidate. Go to Nagatacho and ask political reporters, “Who do you think will be the next prime minister” and they say: “We don’t know.” It is hard to predict who will take the lead after Koizumi, although several names appear in the media from time to time. This has never happened in the history of modern Japanese politics because everyone knew that sooner or later one of the LDP faction leaders would become prime minister.

JMR: Will the LDP look for another charismatic and media-friendly leader like Koizumi?

OF: Yes, but the question is, will they find one? And the answer is no, because Koizumi is unique. He came at a time when the people needed a person like him, who can stand before the public and media and promise reform. Of course, he achieves that partly by manipulating the media.

He is not a family man, he’s divorced. Look at it from a psychological viewpoint. He is talking to the public like they are his wife and children. He’s the first politician like that in Japan. The press calls him “henjin” (weirdo). He is the strange politician, unpredictable. Reporters and politicians are always looking for his next surprise move. That’s how he dominates the political stage so adeptly.

JMR: Are you optimistic for reform in Japan?

OF: Postal reform will definitely take place. As for other reform, that’s a good question. Koizumi says, “This is the beginning,” but in the last four years there was no reform. Even his reform of the highway authorities failed.

People were surprised by this election; they weren’t expecting the LDP to win by such a large margin. Even the LDP politicians were surprised. Until this election we could have talked about two main parties in Japan, but now we are talking again about one.

As long as Koizumi remains in power things will remain the same. Next September the LDP will probably decide to try and extend his tenure as party president. But Koizumi is full of surprises so perhaps he will just retire. An even bigger, more interesting surprise will be if he quits the LDP to establish his own party – but that’s all speculation.

As for the LDP, they got so many this time that in the next election they will probably lose seats. In order to mobilize the vote they will need a charismatic candidate, maybe even a woman – someone who can talk to the public the way Koizumi does. Do they have such a candidate? I doubt it. Things may change as soon as Koizumi quits.

Filed Under: QA
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